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Annexation Agreements - Boundary
Agreements: Walking a Fine Line Into The
Future - A Map of the Dangers to the
Unwary Land Use Traveler
RONALD S. COPE*
INTRODUCTION

On December 20, 1973, the Village of Bloomingdale, DuPage County,
Illinois entered into an annexation agreement with Urban Investment &
Development Corporation, a Delaware corporation.1 The agreement was2
designed to govern the development of approximately 850 acres of land.
At the time the developer had a plan calling for construction of a regional
mall, which has since been constructed and is known as the Stratford Square
Shopping Center, and for the development of other commercial uses and
residential uses. The plan was conceptual in nature and the agreement was
drafted in such a way as to allow both flexibility for change and a level of
3
certainty to guide the parties into the future. In 1973 the statutes of the
State of Illinois permitted annexation agreements of ten years duration
to twenty years.4
although with a change in the law, this one was extended
This agreement contained numerous provisions regarding such subjects as
zoning, subdivision control, ordinance amendments, building control
amendments, liquor control ordinance amendments, "most favored nation
provision," the issuance of building permits and occupancy permits,
bonding, easements and public improvements, conveyances of land to the
Village, conveyances of land for park purposes, conveyances and contributions for the benefit of school districts, provisions for storm water and
drainage and utilities, provisions for the construction of roads and highways,
and even a provision regarding remedies which included the potential for
* Ronald S. Cope is a partner in the law firm of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Cope and
Bush. He is a lecturer in business law at the University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business and has written in the area of land use for the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal

Education.
1. Village of Bloomingdale, Ill., Ordinance No. 73-66 (Dec 20, 1973).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Annexation Agreement between the Village of Bloomingdale, DuPage County,
Illinois and Urban Investment & Development Corporation, para. 26.
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disconnection.5 It also included some unique financing mechanisms such
as a repayment to the developer for monies advanced for the construction
improvements out of sales tax revenues to be generated in the
of division
6
future.

During the twenty year term of the agreement there was only one bump
in the road. A disagreement arose as to the power of the municipality in

regard to approving new developments under the terms of the zoning
ordinance which was created to govern developments of 250 acres or
more.7 Because the original plan was conceptual in nature and because it
was necessary to revise the plan for development as conditions changed, the
ordinance approved for this development allowed for change, but also
provided that the municipality would determine the "compatibility" of each
new plan in accordance with what was already developed on the subject
property. 8 Certain parameters were agreed upon as to what could be built
without the need for approval, but changes in those parameters did require,
ultimately, approval of the Village Board. 9
The agreement worked. It provided guidelines for both the developer and
the municipality and allowed a very successful project to go forward.
Without this agreement, it is unlikely that the development would have
taken place. The assurances the developer needed that the rules would not
be changed during the game provided the predictability necessary for
financing and for determining the economics of the project. At the same
time, the municipality obtained a keystone for its overall development and
a plan which envisioned the ideal growth of the community. Although the
developers who initiated the agreement and the public officials who
approved the agreement have since been replaced by others, this agreement
has worked as a model of what annexation agreements can and should
provide in carefully balancing the interests between local government and
land development.
Looking at the past provides a level of comfort as to what might well take
place in the future. Right now there is another 850 acres waiting to be
developed -- local governmental officials and developers must exhibit the
wisdom and foresight necessary to make the plan a reality which enriches

5. Annexation Agreement between the Village of Bloomingdale, DuPage County,
Illinois and Urban Investment & Development Corporation, para. 26

6. Id.

7. See LaSalle National Bank v. Village of Bloomingdale, 507 N.E.2d 517 (I1. App.
Ct. 1987).
8. Annexation Agreement between the Village of Bloomingdale, DuPage County,
Illinois and Urban Investment & Development Corporation.
9. Id.
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the community. The following is intended as a brief map of dangers that
lay ahead for the inexperienced land use traveler.
In order to reach this level of sophisticated contracting, it is necessary to
take into account a number of issues.

I. ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS
Under Dillon's rule, municipalities only have the power granted to them
by the state legislature and those powers reasonably to be inferred, including
the "police power."' 0 With the passage of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
and the grant of home rule to municipalities with a population of 25,000 or
more, or those who establish home rule by referendum, the question of the
authority to enter into an annexation agreement and what terms may be
included within an annexation agreement become a more general and
rarefied constitutional dimension such as the applicability of the contracts
clause of the United States Constitution, 11 and the "Reserved Powers
12
doctrine."
In 1963, the Illinois legislature passed a statute authorizing the corporate
authorities of any municipality to enter into annexation agreements with
"one or more of the owners of record of land in unincorporated territory.",13 Pursuant to this statute, the agreement may extend for a period of
not to exceed twenty years. 14 The agreement may include the specific
topics of: (a) the actual annexation of the territory; (b) subdivision and
zoning of the property although the required public hearings must take place
and any ordinance amendments must be enacted according to law.1 s The
statute also provides authority for negotiating contributions of either land or
monies or both and the granting of utility franchises.16 It also contains a
catchall provision which allows for the annexation agreement to contain
10. Dillon's Rule states it is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possessesand can exercise the following powers, and not others: First,
those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation, -- not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any
fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation, and the power is denied. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District of Greater Chicago, 305 N.E.2d 639 (Ill.App. Ct. 1973).
11. U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 10, cl.l.
12. See Corp. of the Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, Alderman and Commonalty
of the City of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (NY 1826).
13. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5111-15.1-1 etseq. (West 1994).
14. Id.

15. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15.1-2(b) (West 1994).
16. 65 I. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1l-15.1-2(d)-(e) (West 1994).
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"any other matter not inconsistent with the provisions of this code, nor
17
forbidden by law."
While the grant of power is broad, the question of what "matter" might
be considered "inconsistent with the provisions of this code" or "forbidden
by law" poses a danger for the unwary practitioner. For example, the
question often arises as to whether or not a municipality can provide in an
annexation agreement to grant a liquor license or licenses once the property
is annexed. In the case of Maywood Proviso State Bank v. City of
Oakbrook Terrace,18 the court voided an agreement obligating the City to
provide a license allowing alcoholic beverages to be served. The license
could only be granted pursuant to the provisions19of the Liquor Control Act.
The Village had the right to refuse the request.
II.

JURISDICTION UNDER ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS

One of the most curious features of the annexation agreement statute
relates to jurisdiction. The statute provides that "ff]ack of contiguity to the
municipality of property that is the subject of an annexation agreement does
,,20 Another section of this
not affect the validity of the agreement .
same article provides that property that is "the subject of an annexation
agreement adopted under this Division is subject to the ordinances, control,
and jurisdiction of the annexing municipality in all respects the same as
limits." 21
property that lies within the annexing municipality's corporate
There is an exception to this jurisdictional statement and that is that section
does not apply to: "(i) a county with a population of more than 3,000,000,
(ii) a county that borders a county with a population of more than 3 million,
or (iii) a county with a population of more than 246,000 according to the
1990 federal census and bordered by the Mississippi river, unless the parties
to the annexation agreement have, at the time the agreement is signed,
ownership or control of all property that would make the property that is the
subject of the agreement contiguous to the annexing municipality, in which
case the property that is the subject of the annexation agreement is subject
to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality in all respects
the same as property owned by the municipality that lies within its corporate
'22

limits."

17. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15/1-2(f) (West 1994).
18. 214 N.E.2d 582 (111. App. Ct. 1966).
19. For an analysis and topic by topic approach to annexation agreements see Stewart
H. Diamond, MUNICiPAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN ILLINOIs, Volume II, IICLE, Ch. 11, 1994.
20. 65 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1994).
21. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15.1-2.1(9) (West 1994).
22. 65 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15.1-2.1(b) (West 1994).
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In order to better understand this legislative scheme it is useful to become
acquainted with the case of Village of Lisle v. Action OutdoorAdvertising
Company.23 In that case, the Appellate Court faced the issue of whether
annexation agreements with owners of property that were not contiguous to
the municipality at the time the agreement was executed were enforceable. 24 Municipalities had routinely entered into annexation agreements
with owners of noncontiguous territory and began providing utility service
with the understanding and belief that the laws and ordinances of the
municipality applied to the noncontiguous territory. 25 In the Lisle case,
the annexation agreement between Lisle and the property owner provided
that Lisle's ordinances
would apply to the territory even though it was
26
noncontiguous.
In 1987, the Village and the property owners entered into an annexation
agreement which permitted the owners to tap into the Village's sewer
system, but also contained other limitations, including one which provided
the owners would develop their property in accordance with certain plans
appended to the annexation agreement. 27 Following entering into the
annexation agreement, the owners signed a lease with an outdoor advertising
company allowing that company to erect and maintain an outdoor advertising display sign. 8 The sign company obtained a building and use permit
from the County, but when the Village became aware of the construction its
building department immediately issued a stop work order, which the sign
company refused to obey. 29 The Village then filed a lawsuit seeking
injunctive relief.30 The Appellate Court found that the Village could not
enforce its ordinances against noncontiguous property and, indeed, that the
statutes only authorize "municipalities to enter into annexation agreements
for property 'which may be annexed to such municipality as provided in
Article 7'. . .,,31 The court then concluded that only an agreement
regarding contiguous property would be valid and enforceable. 32 The
court reasoned that by allowing the Village in the instant action to enforce
its ordinances against a property owner through an annexation agreement
would permit it to enforce those ordinances even though it could not do so
23. 544 N.E.2d 836 (111. App. Ct. 1989).

24. Id. at 836.
25. Id.
26. See Village of Lisle v. Action Outdoor Advertising Company, 544 N.E.2d at 841.
27. Id. at 837.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Village of Lisle v. Action Outdoor Advertising Company, 544 N.E.2d at 838.

31. Id. at 839.
32. Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSI= LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

through actual annexation. 33 The Village would then34be doing "indirectly

what it is prohibited by statute from doing directly."
As a result of the Action Outdoor Advertising case, the legislature
35 The amendatory
amended the statute to include the present language.
language to Section 11/15.1-1 also validated annexation agreements covering
amendment.36
noncontiguous property entered into before the date of the
For most situations, the statute creates few problems since properties are
generally annexed soon after the annexation agreement is executed. However, as to noncontiguous properties which are not annexed within a short
period of time, the concern is that such properties could be subject to a
distant municipalities' zoning, subdivision, and building codes well as, presumably, its ordinances imposing sales taxes while the county or nearby
municipalities with more stringent or at least different laws would have no
control. It might also present problems in regard to conflicting zoning concepts between a county and a municipality or even between two municipalities. The possibilities for litigation are numerous. Could, for example, a
developer enter into an agreement with a municipality calling for a certain
zoning classification which the county would not otherwise grant and go
ahead and build that development under municipal zoning even though the
property is not contiguous to the municipality and would otherwise be
deemed to be subject to the county's zoning if not for the annexation
agreement?
Litigation might be avoided if the statute was simply amended to provide:
"(a) property that is the subject of an annexation agreement adopted under
this Division is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the
annexing municipality in all respects the same as property that is contiguous
[instead of "that lies within"] to the annexing municipality's corporate
limits, whether or not the property is contiguous ...."
In other words, Action Outdoor only held that the Village could not
enforce its ordinances pursuant to an annexation agreement against noncontiguous property. The amendment purports to bring both contiguous and noncontiguous property into the corporate limits of the municipality for purposes of enforcing its laws, which is on its face a different matter entirely.

33. Village of Lisle v. Action Outdoor Advertising Company, 544 N.E.2d at 839.
34. Village of Lisle v. Action Outdoor Advertising Company, 544 N.E.2d at 839.

35. See Act of Jan. 1, 1991, P.A. 86-1169, 1990 Ill. Laws 1611; Act of Jan. 1, 1993,
P.A. 87-1137, 1992 Ill. Laws 3091.
36. Id.
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METHOD OF ANNEXATION

One of the more interesting phenomena of the annexation agreement
statute is the provision which provides "land may be annexed to the
municipality in the manner provided in Article 7 at the time the land is or
becomes contiguous to the municipality. 37 Having entered into the
annexation agreement, one would think that when the-property does become
contiguous it will, in fact, be annexed to the municipality. At least that is
the expectation between the municipality and property owner. However, it
is possible that the expectation will be thwarted by the residents of the
annexing municipality. They might, by referendum, veto the annexation.
Something no one anticipated.
There are two basic methods for annexing territory to a municipality.
Under one method, where the property is contiguous and a petition is signed
by the owners of record of all land within such territory and by at least 51%
of the electors residing therein, the annexation takes place by virtue of an
ordinance passed by the corporate authorities. It is only necessary to obtain
a majority vote of the Village Board or City Council as the case may be and
to record the ordinance annexing the territory along with an accurate map,
and the property is deemed to be annexed.38
On the other hand, if some time passes between the signing of the
annexation agreement and portions of the property are sold off by the
original owner, a different result may take place. An annexation may take
place by a written petition signed by a majority of the owners of record and
also by a majority of the electors, which petition must conform to certain
requirements of the statute. 39 This petition is filed in the Circuit Court
and there is a court determination as to whether or not the petition is in
good order.40 If the petition is in good order, then the court orders the
matter of the annexation back41 to the corporate authorities of the annexing
municipality for final action.
It is possible, however, that a petition for a referendum will be filed. A
written petition filed with the municipal clerk by electors of the annexing
municipality equal in number to 10% of the entire vote cast for all candidates for Mayor or President is sufficient to require that the proposition of
the annexation bb placed on a ballot for approval by the voters of the

37. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1994).

38. 5 I!. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1-8 (West 1994).
39. 5 I11.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1-2 (West 1994).
40. 5 I11.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1-4 (West 1994).
41. Id. Please note that if the annexation petition is initiated by ordinance, then the
annexation is subject to a vote of the "electors of the unincorporated territory."
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community. 42 This, of course, could result in the curious situation where

although the municipality and the property owners have agreed to an
annexation because of the referendum, the annexation cannot take place.
This would then place the parties in the strange position of continuing their
relationship through the annexation agreement but unable to fulfill one of
the agreements basic purposes. The property owners might argue they are
still entitled to the same benefits in that they are to be treated the same' as
43
corporate limits.
property that "lies within the annexing municipalities
44
of the referendum.
If this was truly the case it would defeat the purpose
The land would be treated as if it was in the municipality even though there
was no annexation because of the referendum. Indeed, there might be some
to avoid annexation and
situations where it would be far more desirable
45
agreement.
the
of
terms
the
follow
simply

IV. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
It would seem clear that formal agreements between landowners and local
governments regarding the use of land is desirable for a variety of reasons.
However, while in general parlance the term "development agreement" is
used in the context of creating a relationship between local government and
the property owner, the fact is that there is a difference between "annexation
agreements" and "development agreements." The principal difference
between the two is that the annexation agreement is authorized with
' 6 In
reference to a parcel of land which is "in unincorporated ternitory.
contrast, the land subject to a development agreement is already part of the
municipal corporation. Otherwise, in theory and principle, the reasons for
negotiating this type of agreement are the same. Yet, curiously, while ten
states have adopted legislation enabling local governments to enter into
47 only four states
development agreements with landowners/developers,
42. 65 Il. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1-6 (West 1994).

43. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 1994).
44. Please note the referendum issue would only come up if all the property owners

failed to join in the Petition and it was necessary to use the Court ordered procedure. But
65 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. sec. 11/15.1-4 (West 1994) allows for an action to "compel performance" of the agreement. It is not clear how this would impact the legislative act of passing

an annexation ordinance.
45. E.g., Developer would get sewer and water and pay no municipal real estate tax.
46. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1l-15.1-2-1(West 1994).

47. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 24-68-102 (West 1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. sec. 163.3220
(West 1990); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 46-121 (Michie 1985); Idaho Code see. 67-6511

(1991); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 33:4780.21 (West 1990); Md. Code Ann., Code of 1957, Art.
66B. Zoning and Planning sec. 13.01 (1957); Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 278.0201 (1985); N.J. Stat.
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48
appear to have authorized annexation agreements.
It is not clear why Illinois has not adopted a statute authorizing develop-

ment agreements. Even in the absence of such enabling legislation, such

agreements might be valid. Certainly, in regard to home rule municipalities,
it would seem that a development agreement would be valid. The policies
behind a development agreement and an annexation agreement are the
same. 49 In Village of OrlandPark v. FirstFederalSavings & Loan Association of Chicago,5 the court considered an attempt to avoid obligations
contained in an annexation agreement executed pursuant to the statutory
authority contained in the pre-annexation agreement statute. After first
noting that the bank's case involved agreements which preceded the
enactment of the statute, the Illinois Appellate Court then observed:
The authorization of pre-annexation agreements by statute,
such as sec. 11/15.1-1, serves to further important governmental purposes, such as the encouragement of expanding urban
areas and to do so uniformly, economically, efficiently and
fairly, with optimum provisions made for the establishment of
land use controls and necessary municipal improvements
including streets, water, sewer systems, schools, parks, and
similar installations. This approach also discourages fi-agmentation and proliferation of special districts. Additional positive
effects of such agreements include control over health,
police protection, which are vital
sanitation, fire prevention and
51
to governing communities.
Similarly, the California statute permitting development agreements sets
forth as part of its findings the following:
(a) The lack of certainty in the approval of development
projects can result in a waste of resources, escalate the cost of
housing and other development to the consumer, and discourage investment in and commitment to comprehensive planning
which would make maximum efficient utilization of resources
at the least economic cost to the public.
Ann. sec. 40:55D, 45.2. See, Patrick J. Rohan, ZONING & LAND USE CONmOLS. (Matthew
Bender, 1994).
48. III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1994); Cal. Pub. Util. Code sec. 26406

(West 1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 414.0325 (West 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 160(a)-58.21
(1989).
49. See supranote 46 and surrounding text.
50. 481 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).

51. Id. at 950.
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(b) Assurance to the applicant for a development project that
upon approval of the project, the applicant may proceed with
the project in accordance with existing policies, rules and
regulations, and subject to conditions of approval, will
strengthen the public planning process, encourage private
planning, and reduce economic
participation in comprehensive
52
development.
of
costs
Certainly, the same reasons which prompt annexation agreements also
prompt development agreements, and the fact that property is already within
the municipality is not a meaningful difference to justify not enacting a
development agreement enabling statute. Without such a statute, such
agreements face challenges on several fronts.
1. The first level of argument would be that such an agreement would
be ultra vires. That is, that this type of agreement is one which would have
to be specifically authorized by the state legislature. 53 A proponent of this
position would point to the fact that legislation was passed in order to
enable municipalities to enter into annexation agreements and that this
demonstrates that development agreements, especially those dealing with the
same subject matter as the annexation agreement statute, would have to be
authorized by similar legislation. In response, it could be pointed out that
in 1970, the Illinois Constitution was amended to give municipalities
additional power and authority. In addition to creating home rule municipalities, Article 7, sec. 10 of the Illinois Constitution provides for intergovernmental agreements and specifically states the following:
Units of local government and school districts may contract and otherwise
associate with individuals, associations, and corporations in any manner not
prohibited by law or by ordinance.
Under this provision any unit of local government may contract with
individuals, unless specifically prohibited by law or by ordinance. Absent
a showing of some specific prohibition as to the subject matter of the
agreement it should be deemed valid.
2. Since, however, land use is a major concern of such agreements it
would be contended that the law prohibits contract zoning. Contract zoning
generally refers to the circumstance where an agreement or contract is
entered into between the zoning authorities and the property owner whereby
the zoning authority agrees to change a zoning ordinance in exchange for
the property owner performing certain acts. There does not appear to be
52. Cal.Gov't. Code Art. 2.5, Ch. 4, Title 7, Sec. 65884.

53. See infra note 4.
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any one single basis for the rule against such zoning practices, but generally
it is contended that the zoning authority might use the zoning power to
further private interests in violation of public policy and that generally, the
54

be bargained away.
legislative prerogative inherent in zoning should not
In the case of Cederberg v. City of Rockford, the court dealt with the
situation where an ordinance rezoning property from residential to local
business was adopted because the owners executed a restrictive covenant
limiting otherwise permissible uses allowed under the local business
classification.55 The court held the restrictive covenant void and then
56 The court held
proceeded to determine the validity of the ordinance.
that the ordinance was also void and in so doing recited the following
rationale:

The cases cited support the conclusion that, under these
circumstances, the restrictive covenant is void. In addition,
although the exact problem presented by this case seems never
to have been decided in Illinois, a somewhat similar case has
established the rule that "zoning ordinances should not be
subject to bargaining or contract" (Hedrich v. Village of
Niles, 112 Ill.App.2d 68, 77, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969).) It was
there noted that when zoning is conditioned upon collateral

agreements or other incentives supplied by a property owner,

the zoning officials are placed "in the questionable position of
bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no
bearing on the merits of the requested amendment." (Hedrich,
supra, at p. 78, 250 N.E.2d at p. 796.) This reasoning is
clearly applicable to the instant case. There is no indication in
the record that the rezoning was necessary or that it was
granted only after a consideration of the appropriate use57of the
land within the total zoning scheme of the community.
In contrast to the Cederburgcase is the case of Goffinet v. County of
Christian.5 8 In that case, the Christian County Board adopted an ordinance rezoning certain property to permit the defendant Illinois Nap Gas
59
would be produced.
Company to construct a plant where synthetic gas
54. Bruce R. Bailey, Comment, Use and Abuse of ContractZoning, 12 UCLA L. Rev.
897 (1965), Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969).
55. 291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
56. Id. at 252.
57. Id. at 251-252.
58. 333 N.E.2d 731 (I11.App. Ct. 1975).
59. Id. at 732.
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The ordinance granting the rezoning contained certain conditions limiting
the use of the land.60 In particular, the ordinance limited the use of the
property to the particular plant proposed and no other and also provided
that, upon removal of the plant, the zoning classification of the property
would revert to agricultural.61 The plaintiff's argument was that the
restrictions imposed did not apply to other tracts in the same zoning
classification. Consequently, the rezoning was conditional and, therefore,
invalid. 62
The appellate court disagreed. 63 The court recites a litany of cases
which it describes as having given conditional rezoning ordinances a "mixed
reception" with some states approving and others disapprovingfr6 The
court ultimately states:
In our view, the Treadway case [Treadway v. City of
Rockford, 24 Ill.2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (1962)] and the
appellate decisions alluded to do not compel the conclusion
that any and every conditional rezoning ordinance adopted by
a legislative zoning agency in Illinois will be invalid. Treadway stated that conditional rezoning ordinances have not fared
well because they introduce an element of contract which has
no place in the legislative process or because they constitute an
abrupt departure from the comprehensive plan contemplated in
zoning ....
However, we do not believe it to be an absolute precept that
any and all conditional rezoning in Illinois is forbidden.
Without doubt, there is a suitable and proper place for utilization of the process. Some conditional rezoning may be in the
public good, subservient to a comprehensive plan, in the best
interest of the public health, safety and welfare and enacted in
recognition of changing circumstances. Not all conditional
rezoning is onerous, destructive or an abandonment of the
power of65the zoning agency nor does it stem from improper
motives.

60. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 333 N.E.2d at 731.

61. Id.at 732-34.
62. Id. at 734.

63. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 333 N.E.2d at 735.

64. Id.

65. Id. at 735-36.
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It might also be contended that there is a distinction between contract
zoning and conditional zoning. In contract zoning the parties spell out the
terms of their arrangement in contemplation of a zoning ordinance being
passed. In conditional zoning the specific terms and limitations are
contained within the legislative act itself. Where those conditions clearly
relate to the particular development, it is hard to imagine that the traditional
contract zoning issues of the legislature selling its legislative prerogative
would make sense. The conditions are those directly related to enhancement
of the project.
Another possibility is to have the developer go through the zoning process
prior to entering into the development agreement so that a determination is
already reached as to the propriety of the zoning. The development agreement would then assure that the zoning remained in place during the term
of the agreement. The proper legislative finding having taken place before
entering into the agreement. In addition, the agreement would cover other
issues such as the construction of utilities, water facilities, sanitary and
storm sewer facilities and the like which it could be argued are part of the
authority of the municipality granted pursuant to statutes which allow for the
sale of such services. There might also be included a sales 66tax sharing
statute.
agreement which is specifically authorized pursuant to
3. A further issue which confronts those seeking to enforce development contracts is what's called the "Reserved Powers" doctrine. In the case
of Corp. of the Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, Aldermen and
Commonalty of the City of New York, the plaintiffs were suing the city for
an alleged breach of quiet enjoyment of a lease that had been entered into
in 1766.67 The lease, signed by the city, provided that the lessees were
entitled to use the property as a cemetery provided it was fenced and never
used for private secular purposes. 68 In 1823, the Alderman of the City of
New York decided to enact an ordinance prohibiting the use of the premises
as a cemetery. 69 The New York Supreme Court determined that the city
legislative body had no power to make a contract "which should control or
embarrass their legislative powers and duties." 70 In short, the court

66. 65 Il1.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-11-20 (West 1997). This statute permits a variety of

economic incentive agreements.

67. 5 Cow. 538, (N.Y. 1826).
68. Id. at 539.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 540 (N.Y. 1826).
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concluded that the earlier legislature had no power to limit future legislative
72
71
discretion by contract or covenant. The cemetery use had to cease.
In the case of Stone v. Mississippi,the Mississippi legislature in 1867
chartered a company to engage in the lottery business for a period of
twenty-five years. 73 One year later the Mississippi Constitution was
amended and in 1870, the Mississippi legislature passed an act which had
the effect of repealing the 1867 charter.74 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "the legislature cannot bargain away the police 76power of a
State. ' 75 The repeal of the earlier grant was, therefore, valid.
The Reserved Powers doctrine is still recognized today and was discussed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States Trust Company of New York v.
New Jersey,77 Pitted against the Reserved Powers doctrine in that case
was the "Contracts Clause" of the United States Constitution, which simply
provides that "no state shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts."78 If the legislative body had, in effect, entered into a
binding and valid contract, then the "Reserved Powers" provision would not
apply. 79 But if the agreement affected the police power or eminent
domain power, something which could not be bargained, the doctrine did
apply.80 So, for example, the United States Supreme Court held in
Fletcherv. Peck, that the Contracts Clause of the Constitution was applicable to an attempt by a subsequent Georgia legislature to repeal earlier state
land grants issued after widespread fraud and bribery were discovered. 81
So too, in the case of State of New Jersey v. Wilson, the United States
Supreme Court speaking through Chief Justice Marshall held that certain
lands could not be subject to taxation where agreement had been reached
with the Delaware Indians that this land would not be subject to any tax.82

71. Corp. of the Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of
the City of New York at 542.
72. Id.
73. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
74. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. at 816.

75. Id. at 817.
76. Id. at 821.
77. 431 U.S. 1, 21-25 (1977).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

U.S. Const., Art. 1, sec. 10, cl. 1.
431 U.S. at 24-25.
Id. at 24, note 21.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, (1812).
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The State of New Jersey had sought to impose a tax84through a legislative
binding.
act.83 The court held the earlier agreement
Whether a development agreement would be viewed as an improper binding of a subsequent legislature and invoke the "Reserved Powers" doctrine
or whether it would be viewed as an enforceable contract subject to the
"Contracts Clause," would in large measure turn upon the characterization
of the agreement. There is no sure test which is all the more reason for an
enabling act. 85 As for home rule municipalities, it should seem apparent
that their authority would clearly allow for the passage of an ordinance
which would spell out the parameters of development agreements. This
ordinance would be fashioned in the same manner as the enabling legislation
which permits annexation agreements and since there appears to be no prohibition under state law which preempts such home rule authority, such an
86
ordinance would most likely be held valid.

V. BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS
One of the more fascinating issues is determining whether there has been
a boundary agreement which limits the ability of a municipality to annex a
particular piece of property.
The case of Village of Lisle v. Village Woodridge, involved a boundary
agreement between the Villages of Lisle and Woodridge which was entered
into in 1979.87 The written agreement provided in pertinent part as
follows:

83. Id. at 166; See also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819)(holding an act of the New Hampshire legislature that altered the charter
of Dartmouth College granted by the British Crown void under the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution as the original charter was not dissolved by the revolution).
84. Id. at 167.
85. One other interesting argument relates to the enforcement of a disconnection
provision. The court in the case of Elm Lawn Cemetery Company v. City of Northlake, 237
N.E.2d 348 (2nd Dist. 1968) held that a provision calling for disconnection in the agreement
was valid and enforceable although not specifically provided for in the annexation statute.
In so doing, the court stated "[e]nforcement of the agreement according to its plain terms in
no way infringes the discretionary power of the board since it had already exercised its
discretion." Id. at 248 (quoting Arlington Heights National Bank v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 213 N.E.2d 264, 269 (1966)).
86. Il Const. Of 1970 art. VII, sec. 6 (1970); Wilmette Park Dist. v. Village of
Wilmette, 490 N.E.2d 1282 (111. 1986); Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v.
Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. 1985).
App. Ct. 1989).
87. 548 N.E.2d 1337,1338 (Ill.
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"2. Neither Lisle nor Woodridge shall act to annex or exercise any
zoning or subdivision control authority beyond the boundary line established
by this Agreement."88
On March 7, 1987, Woodridge's board of trustees authorized by
ordinance the purchase of approximately 140 acres of land, part of which
89
was on the Lisle side of the boundary-line established by the agreement.
This parcel was purchased from Forest City, the beneficial owner of a land
trust, and that purchase was conditioned on Woodridge and Forest City
entering into an annexation agreement as well as Woodridge approving a
zoning ordinance for the property. 90 Lisle filed suit claiming that the
annexation was in violation of the boundary agreement. 91 Woodridge
argued that the boundary agreement prohibiting the parties from annexing
beyond the boundary line was invalid as an unauthorized assumption of
power.93 2 In short, the Village contended that the agreement was ultra
9
vires.

The court stated the following:
The crucial language relevant to this appeal is contained in
paragraph 2 of the agreement. To the extent the agreement
prohibits Woodridge from acting to annex the subject property,
we find it to be invalid and unenforceable. Our decision in
Village of Long Grove v. Village of Kildeer (1986), 146
ll.App.3d 979, 100 ll.Dec. 341, 497 N.E.2d 319, is controlling on this issue. In Village of Long Grove we held that there
was no statutory authority for municipalities to enter into a
boundary line-agreement prohibiting annexation.
(146
Ill.App.3d at 980-82, 100 Ill.Dec. at 342-43, 497 N.E.2d at
320-21.) That holding applies equally to an agreement
prohibiting an act to annex. Thus, the boundary line agreement in this case is invalid to the extent that paragraph 2
purports to prohibit any act to annex by either Lisle or
Woodridge.

The court further went on to advise that even though the statute had been
amended to expressly authorize boundary-line agreements prohibiting
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Village of Lisle v. Village Woodridge, 548 N.E.2d at 1339.

92. Village of Lisle v. Village Woodridge, 548 N.E.2d at 1340-41.
93. Id. at 1340.
94. Id. at 1342.
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95 Since this
annexations that amendment would only act prospectively.
agreement was entered into in 1979, it was not affected by the
boundary line
96

amendment.

One other point of significant interest in the Village of Lisle case relates
to intergovernment cooperation and intergovernmental agreements. Lisle
argued that the agreement was authorized pursuant to Article VII, see. 10,
of the Illinois Constitution . The court refused to accept this argument,
stating:
Finally, Lisle contends that the agreement is valid pursuant
to article VII, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution (ill.
Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 10) and section 5 of the Intergovenmental Cooperation Act (ll.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 745).
Article VII, sec. 10, of the Illinois Constitution clearly authorizes municipalities to enter agreements to "exercise, combine,
or transfer anypoweror function, in any manner not prohibited
by law or by ordinance." (emphasis added)(ill. Const. 1970, art.
VII, see. 10.) The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act
provides, in pertinent part: "Any one or more public agencies
may contract with any one or more other public agencies to
perform any governmental service, activity or undertaking
which any of the public agencies entering into the contract is
authorized by law to perform." (emphasis added) (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 745.) Both article VII, section 10, of
the Illinois Constitution and section 5 of the Intergovernmental
Cooperation Act authorize municipalities to enter into cooperative agreements, but only to the extent that the agreement
encompasses subject matter over which the municipalities
already have authority. Article VII, section 10, uses the word
"power," and section 5 limits the agreement to those functions
a municipality is "authorized by law to perform." Clearly,
neither article VII, section 10, nor section 5 gives municipalities a separate source of authority to perform functions not
otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute. Accordingly, we reject Lisle's argument that article VII, section 10, and
section 5 grant municipalities the authority to enter into

95. Id.

96. Village of Lisle v. Village Woodridge, 548 N.E.2d at 1342.
97. Ill.Const. 1970 Art. VII, Sec. 10) and Sec. 5 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation

Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 127, para. 745).
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agreements which give98the municipalities powers which they
otherwise do not have.
Of course, one might respond that each municipality certainly has the
authority to determine whether or not to annex certain property. Indeed, the
law is clearly established in this state that the determination of whether a
municipality should expand its boundaries is clearly a question for the
legislative branch of government. 99 The agreement here was, it could be
contended, an exercise of the power to refuse to annex.
Indeed, the Illinois Second District Appellate Court has recognized the
power of a home rule municipality to pass a resolution to provide that the
city would neither accept annexation nor supply municipal services to
certain areas outside its boundaries designated as "open space."10 0' The
court held that the resolutions "clearly pertain[ed] to the 'government and
affairs' of the municipality," did not involve the exercise of "extraterritorial
jurisdiction or 'inverse condemnation' and were within Naperville's home
rule powers, and thus were not subject to 'collateral attack for voidness."'101 Although this was the act of a home rule municipality, there
at least seems to be some viable argument for the notion that if a municipality has the authority to choose not to annex, and this applies to home rule
as well as non-home rule municipalities, it may then contract with another
municipality to describe the areas which it will not annex.
It is clear, however, that Section 11-12-9 of the Municipal Code, clearly
permits and, indeed, requires the establishment of boundary lines, if not,
boundary agreements. First, for the purposes of planning jurisdiction, this
section provides as follows:
If unincorporated territory is within one and one-half miles
of the boundaries of two or more corporate authorities that
have adopted official plans, the corporate authorities involved
may agree upon a line which shall mark the boundaries of the
jurisdiction of each of the corporate authorities who have
adopted such agreement.
This one and one-half mile reference is in connection with the general
power of a municipality to prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan
reflecting the present and future development or redevelopment of the
98. Village of Lisle v. Village of Woodridge, 548 N.E.2d at 1342-43.

99. See Spaulding School Dist. No. 58 v. City of Waukegan, 165 N.E.2d 283 (II1.
1960); See alsoNorth v. Board of Education of Community High School Dist. No. 203, 145
N.E.158 (I1. 1924).
100. Forest Preserve Dist. v. Kelley, 387 N.E.2d 368, 372 (II1.App. Ct. 1979).
101. Id. at 372.
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municipality. The municipality is given the authority to make the plan
applicable "to land situated within the corporate limits and contiguous
miles beyond the corporate limits
territory not more than one and one-half
102
municipality.
any
in
and not included
Furthermore, this plan:
may be implemented by ordinances (a) establishing reasonable
standards of design for subdivisions and for resubdivisions of
unimproved land and of areas subject to redevelopment in
respect to public improvements as herein defined; (b) establishing reasonable requirements governing the location, width,
course, and surfacing of public streets and highways, alleys,
ways for public service facilities, curbs, gutters, sidewalks,
street lights, parks, playgrounds, size of lots to be used for
residential purposes, storm water drainage, water supply and
distribution, sanitary sewers, and sewage collection and
treatment; and (c) may designate land suitable for annexation
zoning classification for
to the municipality and recommended
103
annexation.
upon
such land
The statute, therefore, grants subdivision control to a municipality even
as to property located outside its municipal borders and a plat of subdivision
of a contiguous area may not be recorded unless it is in conformity with the
applicable official map and subdivision control ordinances of the municipality.104 The Illinois Supreme Court in Petterson v. City of Naperville, has
upheld the statutory105grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction with regard to
subdivision controls.
In this connection there has been much confusion between zoning control
and subdivision control. It is important to note that a county's zoning
ordinances control in any county that has enacted a zoning ordinance
regardless of whether such ordinance was enacted before or after the
municipality's exercise of its extraterritorial jurisdiction.10 6 While this
has been the accepted law, how is this impacted by the amendments to
Section 11-15.1-2 discussed earlier?
The statute also answers the question of what happens when two
municipalities are closer than three miles to each other. The statute states:
102. 65 IlL. Camp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-12-5(1) (West 1997).
103. 65 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-12-5(1) (West 1997).
104. Sec 6511. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-12-12 (West 1993).
105. 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).

App. Ct. 1973); City
106. See City of Canton v. County of Fulton, 296 N.E.2d 97 (Ill.

of Urbana v. County of Champaign, 389 N.E.2d 1185 (11. 1979).
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In the absence of such an agreement, the jurisdiction of any one of the
corporate authorities shall extend to a median line equidistant from its
boundary and the boundary of the other corporate authority nearest to 1the
07
boundary of the first corporate authority at any given point on the line.
It should be noted, however, that this does not in any way limit the power
of a municipality to annex property that is not within its boundary line. It
only serves to extend the limit of planning authority. The statute is specific
in stating that while the parties may agree not to annex territory "which lies
within the jurisdiction of any other municipality," it goes on to state the
following: "In the absence of such a boundary line agreement, nothing in
as a limitation on the power of any
this paragraph shall be construed
108
territory."'
annex
to
municipality
Finally, one further note concerning this issue. In the case of Groenings
v. City of St. Charles the court considered a boundary agreement entered
into between two non-home rule municipalities, pursuant to which they
agreed to neither annex nor exercise zoning or subdivision control beyond
territory located on their side of the boundary line established by the
agreement. 1°9 Property owners who desired to annex to St. Charles in
preference to the Village of Wayne, filed suit challenging the validity of the
boundary agreement claiming that the agreement "tortiously interfered with
their prospective economic advantage" and that their lack of participation in
10 The
the formation of the agreement was a denial of due process.'
appellate court rejected this argument. 111 The court reasoned that in
order to have a property interest a person must have more than a unilateral
expectation- of that interest.l12 The party must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to that property interest. 113 In this case, the plaintiff, while
arguing that there was a decrease in property value as a result of the
limitation as to where its property could be annexed failed to demonstrate
that St. Charles would have annexed the land even if there had been no
boundary agreement. 114 The court pointed out that St. Charles was under
no obligation to annex plaintiffs property. 115 Under these circumstances,

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

65 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-12-9(West 1993).
Id.
App. Ct. 1991).
574 N.E.2d 1316 (Ill.
Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 574 N.E.2d at 1318.
Id.at 1324.
Id.
Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 574 N.E.2d at 1324.
Id.
Id.
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no claim to due process in the
the plaintiff had no property interest and116
agreement.
boundary
the
of
establishment
CONCLUSION
If a magician had conjured up this complexity of legal "tricks" to thwart
the best intentions of those seeking a land development agreement, our
conjurer might have stated: "Tleasewatch carefully and you will observe
that at no time has the land moved." This is both the sad and humorous
part of the sorry state of our present laws governing this subject.
Legally conceived lines might vacillate in the legislative or judicial winds,
but the land itself is eternal from pristine prairie to urban slum and, perhaps,
back again in a far distant time. The law should reflect the felt needs of
society. The key to the law thought Justice Holmes, in fact, its very
essence, was predictability (being able to advise a client as to how a.court
will decide specific legal questions). Combining the land, which still has
not moved, with laws allowing predictable outcomes should be the goal in
drafting land development agreements. Unfortunately, competing local
interests, almost like feuding medieval barons, have caused a patchwork of
legislation very suitable for legal alchemy, but not very suitable to serve the
people affected.
What is needed is a thorough analysis and re-ordering. There should be
a statute permitting development agreements and there should be a clear
linkage between sections of the code dealing with planning, subdivisions,
and boundaries and those sections dealing with agreements and annexations.
Until easily understood linkages are created, uncertainty and unpredictability
will remain along with the likely potential for litigation.

116. Id.

